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GOD AND THE MORAL ORDER: 
A REPLY TO LAYMAN 
Peter Byrne 
C. Stephen Layman has argued that, if there is no God, there will be circum-
stances in which we have most reason not to do as morality requires. This is a 
reductio of naturalism, given that the naturalist accepts that morality is always 
overriding. This reply contends that Layman's reductio fails, because: (1) the 
circumstances in which morality does not override will be rare on Layman's 
own analysis; (2) the cases used to support his argument can be re-described 
as ones in which conventional moral rules are set aside, but morality is not; 
(3) he fails to consider from what standpoint an agent judges clashes between 
morality and self-interest. 
I 
In vol. 19 of this journal C. Stephen Layman defends the thesis that, in the 
absence of belief in God and an after-life, morality is beset by a species of 
incoherence.1 This incoherence entails that, if morality is a rational enter-
prise, God must exist and an afterlife must await us. 
Layman summarizes his argument thus: 
1. In every actual case, one has most reason to do what is morally 
required. 
2. If there is no God and no life after death, then there are cases in 
which morality requires that one make a great sacrifice that confers 
relatively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms). 
3. If in a given case one must make a great sacrifice in order to do what 
is morally required, but the sacrifice confers relatively modest ben-
efits (or prevents relatively modest harms), then one does not have 
most reason to do what is morally required. 
4. Therefore, if there is no God and no life after death, then in some 
cases one does not have most reason to do what is morally required. 
5. Therefore, given (1) and (4), "There is no God and no life after death" 
is false. 
(5) only entails that either there is a God or there is no life after death. 
Further argument is then offered for concluding that, if there is a life after 
death whose character supplies the grounds for the truth that one always 
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has most reason to do what is morally required, then it is because there is 
a God who is responsible for the moral order thus established. 
Examples support Layman's argument. A central one concerns an 
agent, Ms Poore, who is in deep poverty and who has the opportunity to 
steal money from someone else. The potential thief is in dire straits and 
needs funds to fulfil basic human needs (she is ill, poorly housed and so 
forth). The victim of the theft does not need the money and will not be 
substantially harmed by the loss of this sum. In the absence of God and 
an afterlife, Ms Poore has no overwhelming reason to obey the relevant 
moral rules and therefore (1) is false. 
Layman is at pains to defend his argument from the following counter 
to his examples: it is true by definition that morality is overriding. Some 
might object: to note that morality tells Ms Poore not to steal is to note that 
she has greatest reason not to steal. Layman responds that, if it is true that 
we have overriding reasons for being guided by moral claims, then this is 
not true by definition - as the case of Ms Poore seems to demonstrate. Lay-
man states that such hypothetical examples show that "we lack good rea-
son to think that 'Moral reasons are overriding' is a necessary truth" (311). 
In truth, he does not need to say this. If it is a necessary truth that there is 
a God with the attributes traditionally assigned (and necessarily true that 
this God establishes a providential order in things), then "moral reasons 
are overriding" will likewise be necessary.2 But it will be a substantive ne-
cessity and one that is derived from necessary truths about the existence 
and character of a deity. What Layman needs to object to is the claim that 
"Moral reasons are overriding" is a trivial, definitional truth. 
II 
Layman's argument in support of premise (1) consists in an appeal to our 
intuitions. If we believe that someone in doing an act was doing his/her 
duty would we not assume that the act was fully justified on this basis? 
We just take it that if an act is someone's moral duty, then (but not on defi-
nitional grounds-see above) that person has overriding reasons to do it. 
If we deny this, then we must be prepared to admit that in some cases the 
answer to the question "Why should I be moral?" is "I should not." 
One strategy of response to Layman is to accept his sub-conclusion (4) 
but deny (1) by contending that (4) does not demonstrate that atheism 
provides a real threat to the moral life. Layman's reasoning is indeed lim-
ited. The characteristics of cases such as Ms Poore's which make them al-
legedly clear examples of agents having good reason overall not to follow 
their perceptions of what is honest, right etc are just those which make 
them few al1.d far between. First they are cases where there is no real vic-
tim of the wrongdoing contemplated. Ms Poore is to steal from someone 
who has so much that she will not be substantially harmed by the theft. 
Second Ms Poore is very unlikely to be caught out in her theft. So Ms 
Poore faces a clear clash between strong, legitimate claims of self-interest 
and the wrongness of theft considered in isolation from any harmful ef-
fects. From consideration of this example and others in the paper, Layman 
offers us this principle: "when considerations of prudence and morality clash, if 
the prudential considerations are truly momentous while the results of behaving 
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immorally are relatively minor, then morality does not override prudence" (308, 
emphasis in the original). This can be styled the principle "In extreme cas-
es morality is not overriding." 
It is so far open to the atheist to accept that there are some extreme cas-
es in which premise (1) of Layman's argument is false. "Extreme" might 
seem a tendentious word in the context of this discussion. Yet Layman 
characterizes his own argument as questioning the "the rationality of do-
ing what's morally required if the gains (for all affected) are relatively mi-
nor and the long-term disadvantages to the agent are momentous" (310). 
But this very account of the force of his examples strongly suggests that 
abandoning the intuition that morality always overrides is a reasonable 
option. It is true that on the page following the above quotation he makes 
the atheist's case sound desperate: "if immoral actions are sometimes 
backed by reasons as strong as (or stronger than) those backing the moral 
alternative, then the institution of morality lacks rational authority" (311). 
I submit that this ringing declaration does not square too well with the 
previous quotation from p. 310. The sentence that immediately follows 
on p. 311 is not so ringing: "That is, the system of morality does not have 
a [printed text: "does not a have"] blanket endorsement from the rational 
point of view." This last claim is merely the modest p. 310 statement that 
there are some tightly specified cases where what is morally required is 
not rationally required. 
Layman does little, in truth, to show that "in extreme cases morality 
is not overriding" is terribly dangerous or poses a substantive threat to 
the moral life. Unless he can do this, his argument is open to a simple 
challenge: premise (1) is false. Given that, there would be no reductio of 
unbelief to be derived from it. He does indeed criticize Philippa Foot's 
argument3 for the claim that moral considerations are not always overrid-
ing. But the (alleged) badness of her argument for the conclusion does not 
of course show that the conclusion is false. One way of taking Layman's 
examples with their commentary is as a straightforward argument for the 
claim that moral considerations/judgements are not always overriding. 
The "so what?" response of the atheist to Layman gets further strength 
from his paper's acceptance that there is inherent value in doing what 
is morally required and inherent dis value in not doing what is morally 
required. Virtue, he concedes, is a benefit to those who possess it (308). 
He does not wish to suggest that there are no moral reasons for doing 
this rather than that because all reasons for action have in truth to be self-
regarding (310). We can support Layman in these judgements by bringing 
in the Aristotelian thought that acts of virtue constitute their own ends. 
The good produced by virtuous action need not be wholly or mainly in 
its effects. Virtuous actions are not merely the means to the good, as plug-
ging in the kettle is the means to heating the water. The good for a human 
being is a kind of living and acting: it is in part constituted by the acts 
we perform and the dispositions behind them. Virtuous, good actions are 
worthwhile for the sake of the activity involved in doing them. They will 
have ends beyond themselves. Thus an act of generosity will seek the im-
provement of another's lot. But such an act also constitutes its own end. It 
is worthwhile doing it even if it fails in its external end. So, if a naturalist 
follows Aristotle, she or he can say that right action is a manifestation of 
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the human good and as such the human good will in part exist regard-
less of the consequences of right action. Hence, Layman is right: there is a 
sense in which virtue will indeed benefit its possessor.4 
Layman's point about the inherent good in virtuous acts thus strength-
ens the thought that it can only be in extreme cases that what is morally 
required is not rationally required, since there will always be some loss of 
good in doing an act contrary to the claims of right. 
III 
Layman's argument depends on the point that "morality is overriding" is 
not a definitional truth, not a trivial, linguistic necessity. Even though we 
can concede this for the sake of argument, there is still a problem under-
standing why we should not say that the example of Ms Poore is a case 
where someone does what is morally justified, albeit she acts in violation 
of a customary moral rule. 
It is news from nowhere that what appear to be moral considerations 
do not always properly trump what appear to be non-moral ones. Moral 
considerations at first blush might suggest that I should currently be help-
ing to feed children and build irrigation ditches in the Third World, rather 
than live the comfortable life of a Professor in southern England. But most 
would concede that to condemn me on this score is to ignore the fact that 
such self-sacrifice would be a work of supererogation rather than duty. 
I have an interest in my own well-being (as defined by my own projects 
and plans) which morality can recognize as being legitimate and as thus 
placing limits on the extent to which I am required to act on other moral 
considerations. Continuing in my profession versus selling up and going 
to help the indigent in Africa may look like a clash between non-moral 
considerations and moral ones. But at a higher level it is not, since moral-
ity grants me a legitimate interest in my good. To say that morality grants 
this interest is to say that my heeding to this interest is not only acceptable 
from a personal point of view but also from the view of what is proper 
and improper in the behavior of any human being as such. Judging from 
an impartial standpoint, there are limits to how much self-sacrifice can 
be demanded of individuals. The judgement I make about myself could be 
commended from that impartial standpoint and be openly recommended 
to all as one that they could endorse if they were in similar circumstances. 
Hence we have the paradoxical conclusion: morality can judge that moral 
considerations (narrowly defined) can be sometimes given less weight 
than non-moral ones (narrowly defined). 
If we accept the above reflections flowing from the notion of superero-
gation, we can be led by intermediate examples to see Ms Poore's actions 
as being backed by moral reasons. The familiar Heinz dilemma from stud-
ies of moral development shows us the obvious truth: sometimes there are 
decisive moral reasons for disobeying customary moral rules. Heinz needs 
medicines to save a gravely ill dependant. He has no money to buy them. 
He can only steal them from the local pharmacy. He does so, backed by 
higher order principles of respect for persons and the value of life which 
trump the conventional rule "Stealing is wrong." Now why should we not 
describe Ms Poore's action in precisely these terms? She needs the money 
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to be acquired via her act of theft for reasons morality would endorse. She 
is sick, indigent, poorly housed, and cut off from the possibility of flour-
ishing as a human being. Ms Poore's state is not simply bad from the point 
of view of prudence. It is also bad from the point of view of morality. It is 
thus open to us to describe Ms Poore's decision to steal in these terms: it 
is a morally legitimate setting aside of a conventional moral rule, which 
holds only for the most part anyway, in favor of trumping moral consider-
ations to do with human well-being. I suggest that the availability of this 
distinction is implicit in the key principle that Layman says his examples 
support and exemplify: "when considerations of prudence and morality clash, 
if the prudential considerations are truly momentolls while the results of behav-
ing immorally are relatively minor, then morality does not override prudence" 
(308). The application of the clause "if the prudential considerations are truly 
momentous" invites the invocation of the notions found in supererogation 
and in the Heinz dilemma. And that application is reinforced by the clause 
"while the results of behaving immorally are relatively minor." 
What makes Heinz's actions not an offence against morality but a rec-
ognizable result of the application of moral reason can be brought out by 
considering the Kantian formula "Act only on that maxim which you can 
at the same time will to be a universal law." Heinz's maxim is something 
like: "Let me steal where this is necessary to secure the well-being of oth-
ers." He can will this as a universal law. That is to say, he can imagine 
openly recommending this maxim to others as rule that they can follow 
and accept. Given the generic interests of human beings, the rule stands 
a very good chance of being assented to as one among the many that we 
could all freely accept as the basis of an impartial social order.5 Now my 
suggestion is that Ms Poore's decision can also be represented in a maxim 
that will pass the same test. "Where stealing causes little harm to oth-
ers but is necessary to ensure one's own vital interests as a human being, 
stealing is allowed" also stands a very good chance as a rule that could be 
openly recommended to others for acceptance in the same way as Heinz's 
maxim. It might be seen as resting on the same core intuition: the force of 
the rule "Do not steal" can be trumped by considerations of human well-
being if they are of sufficient moment. 
IV 
So far we have found two problems with Layman's argument. First the 
atheist can accept it because its conclusion allows only of extreme cases 
in which we have reason to set aside the verdicts of morality. Second the 
atheist can respond that Layman's cases are easily described as ones in 
which agents have good reasons from a moral standpoint to set aside con-
ventional moral rules. These problems stem from the fact that Layman 
is not running the crude moral argument for God based on the premise 
that moral considerations can have no weight with rational agents unless 
they are backed by prudential ones. Layman outlines and rejects this view 
(see 309-10). He states that moral reasons have their own force and that 
they can outweigh prudential ones (310). This entails that for prudential 
considerations to outweigh moral ones they have to be very strong indeed 
and the moral considerations they are outweighing correspondingly light. 
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That makes the examples few and invites us to see the prudential consid-
erations as having significance from the moral point of view. 
The above paragraph is rich in the metaphor of weighing reasons on 
either side of a decision. So is Layman's discussion: "what one should do 
is what one has the weightiest reasons to do" (310). Layman's way of ap-
proaching his moral argument suggests the following picture: rational 
agents are aware of a variety of reasons for action. They see prudential 
reasons vying with moral reasons. They measure whether moral reasons 
for doing something outweigh prudential reasons for not doing it and 
they follow that set of reasons which is stronger overall. Now it is time 
to ask the question "From what standpoint does Layman's rational agent 
weigh or measure reasons for action?" Layman's agents, such as Ms Poore, 
recognize both moral and prudential reasons. They give a certain weight 
to reasons of both types. When the different types of reason point in dif-
ferent directions, they seek to determine where the balance of reason falls 
and act accordingly. Such a picture implies that Layman's agents are neu-
tral as between the dictates of morality and self-interest. Their underlying 
commitment is to rationality. They see rational force in both impartial and 
partial reasons for action. They do not commit themselves to either type 
of reason, to either the moral or the self-interested standpoint, but only to 
following the greater reason. 
We should find the above puzzling. By reference to what does Ms Poore 
decide that reasons relating to her own well-being are greater in weight 
than those relating to the wrongness of theft? According to Layman, she 
faces the choice between stealing and living in grinding poverty for the 
rest of her life (307). Now one way in which that choice might present 
itself to her is this: "I must look to my own interest. I would be a fool if I 
let a few moral qualms condemn me to a life of misery." That manner of 
representation gives our agent seeing no non-conventional harm in theft. 
Alternatively the choice might present itself as one between avoiding pov-
erty at the cost of dishonoring herself: "Yes, I could steal, but that would 
be dishonest and even if I were never detected, I would be dishonored 
thereby." That manner of representation works for an agent for whom 
acting immorally is simply out. To act contrary to conscience is to suffer 
harm, harm which no good fortune can wipe away. The problem with 
Layman's talk about weightier and stronger reasons is that it does not tell 
us whether Ms Poore is troubled by thoughts of dishonor, or reflections 
to the effect that she can only avoid poverty by becoming a thief-a status 
which she can never lose no matter how much she prospers. 
The unclarity in the language of weighing reasons for action, and of 
judging which reasons are stronger than others, lies in the fact that such 
language implies a common, neutral means of measuring the reasons. The 
very contrast, however, between morality and self-interest suggests that 
there can be no such means. The agent is faced with a choice between 
points of view and perspectives. From within a point of view or perspec-
tive there can be weighing. From the standpoint of prudence the agent 
could weigh how likely is disclosure of the theft and how costly any con-
sequent public disgrace might be. But from this point of view there could 
simply no sense in which the harm that consists in knowing the one is a 
thief could be felt and exist. From the perspective of morality the claims 
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of self-interest can indeed be registered, but there is no question of their 
strength being a matter of weighing in any straightforward sense. They 
will either be set aside with the thought that stealing is simply" out" or en-
ter in to a consideration of what is right from an impartial or virtues-based 
point of view-as discussed in section III above. What remains a mystery 
is how any agent could measure the relative strengths of the two kinds of 
consideration from neither the moral or prudential point of view but from 
a neutral standpoint. 
The above questions are a way of returning to the theme that "morality 
is overriding," whilst not being analytic, may be expressive of a substan-
tive necessity. The ground of its necessity, if we deem it be a necessity, 
would include this thought: moral considerations are things that call for 
our allegiance. If Ms Poore has given them her allegiance, then she can 
only cope with the clash between moral and prudential considerations in 
one of the two ways mentioned. She can dismiss the prudential consider-
ations or explore the thought that her own well-being and the duties she 
owes to herself are of sufficient weight in this case to justify an impartial 
verdict that a conventional moral rule be set aside. In this latter case, her 
reasoning has a logic to it, that set out in section III. It is truly hard to see 
the logic in her reasoning on Layman's presentation of the matter. 
Ms Poore could go down another route and give her allegiance to self-
interest. Faced with the practical dilemma Layman describes, Ms Poore 
might opt for stealing in the absence of any sense that this choice could 
be defended from the moral point of view. Leaving aside the possibility 
that this decision is but an example of weakness of will, her allegiance to 
morality has been tested and she has decided to give it up. Such a decision 
is intelligible, albeit regrettable. She has done that which she concedes is 
bad for a human being as such to do, that which she could not expect other 
human beings, judging impartially and rationally, to endorse. 
v 
This paper has argued that Layman's argument from morality to God fails 
because premise (1) "In every actual case, one has most reason to do what 
is morally required" can be defended even though there is no God and no 
afterlife. The atheist who does not want to admit Layman's argument as 
part of a cumulative case for theism (see 304-05) has room for maneuver 
before accepting (5) "There is no God and no life after death' is false." 
A diagnosis of Layman's failure to see the room for maneuver can be 
offered. He has rightly eschewed the crude argument for theism which is 
based on the premise that moral considerations can have no weight with 
a rational agent unless right conduct is clearly to the agent's long term 
advantage. This swift argument to a rewarding and punishing God fails 
because it denies the possibility of genuine allegiance to moral demands. 
Having allowed that moral considerations motivate independent of their 
coincidence with prudential ones, Layman is then unable to give a full 
and clear characterization of how an agent can judge that moral consider-
ations are outweighed in a given case by prudential ones. In particular, he 
is not able to explain how reason can come down on the side of looking 
after one's own welfare in cases of apparent conflict between morality and 
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prudence while such a decision of reason somehow remains outside the 
moral sphere. Further, he has not appreciated the thought that morality! 
virtue is something that claims the allegiance of agents. Both these points 
suggest a deeper necessity than mere analyticity to the claim that morality 
is overriding. 
Even if the analysis contained in sections III and IV of the above is reject-
ed, it remains the case the Layman's disavowal of the crude argument from 
morality to God leaves the atheist with a conclusion that can be accepted 
without embarrassment: in extreme cases morality does not override. 
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NOTES 
1. C. Stephen Layman, "God and the Moral Order," Faith and Philosophy 19, 
304-16. Subsequent references to Layman's paper are given in brackets in the 
text of this reply. 
2. It will not then signify-see Layman 307 -that we can conceive of cas-
es in which moral reasons do not override in the absence of there being a God. 
This will be parallel to be our being able to conceive of triangles with internal 
angles adding up to 200 degrees in the absence of a knowledge of relevant 
geometric truths. 
3. P. Foot "Are Moral Considerations Overriding?" in P. Foot Virtues alld 
Vices (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 181-
88. 
4. For these thoughts about the relation between goodness and virtue see 
N. Sherman The Fabric of Character, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 114ff. Lay-
man's recognition that there is a good within virtuous action and not merely 
in its effects makes his moral argument for God's existence superior in this 
respect to the similar case in L. Zagzebski "Does Ethics Need God?" Faith and 
Philosophy 4, 1987, 294-303. 
5. This way of understanding the test within Kant's Categorical Impera-
tive is due to R. Green Religious Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1978). 
